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Abstract
In [13], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued
in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms
of a paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics attempt to escape contradictions,
there are many hints that indicate it could be worth while to engage
in a research of this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1] have
raised several arguments against this approach. In the present paper
we attempt to answer the main questions presented by Arenhart and
Krause. We will argue, firstly, that the obstacles presented by them
are based on a specific metaphysical stance, which we will character-
ize in terms of what we call the Orthodox Line of Research (OLR).
Secondly, that this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that
a different one, namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research
(CMLR) provides a different perspective in which the Paraconsistent
Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS) can be regarded as a
valuable prospect that could be used by different interpretations of
quantum mechanics. Finally, we provide a set of specific answers to
the main problems raised by Arenhart and Krause in order to clarify
our line of research as well as the original perspective introduced by
the PAQS.
Keywords: quantum superposition, paraconsistent approach, measurement prob-
lem.
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Introduction
In [13], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued in
favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of a
paraconsistent approach. We claimed that, even though most interpreta-
tions of Quantum Mechanics (QM) attempt to escape contradictions, there
are many reasons why it could be worth while to engage in a research of
this kind. Recently, Arenhart and Krause [1] have raised several arguments
against the Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS).
Their obstacles are condensed in the following six main statements:
I. The PAQS does not allow for contradictions due to its incompatibil-
ity with the Semantic Requirement, the Minimal Property Ascription
Condition and the Paraconsistent Property Ascription.
II. The PAQS obscures the meaning of probability in QM.
III. The PAQS does not explain the measurement problem.
IV. Contrary to what is claimed by PAQS, contradictions are not observed
in QM.
V. The PAQS inflates unnecessarily the population of the world with con-
tradictions.
VI. The PAQS does not explain the vanishing of terms in the superposition
after measurement.
First of all we must remark that in [13] we did not propose an interpre-
tation nor a metaphysical scheme but only called the attention to the need
of considering quantum superpositions as ontologically robust and the possi-
bility of doing so in terms of a paraconsistent approach. However, including
contradictions might be regarded as preparing the stage for a metaphysical
step, this is why we believe that —now entering the scenery of metaphysics—
the remarks and considerations of Arenhart and Krause deserve careful at-
tention as well as answers. In this paper we will argue that:
i) Arenhart and Krause place their obstacles from a specific metaphysical
stance, which we will characterize in terms of what we call the Orthodox
Line of Research (OLR).
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ii) That this is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one,
namely, a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research (CMLR) provides a
different perspective in which PAQS can be regarded as a valuable prospect.
Furthermore, that within the CMLR the problems and obstacles raised by
Arenhart and Krause disappear.
Firstly, we will characterize the OLR in order to show later on how the
arguments raised by Arenhart and Krause rely on this particular metaphys-
ical stance. We will also put forward an alternative line, the CMLR, which
implies a different metaphysical stance in order to confront the problem of
interpreting QM in general, and quantum superpositions in particular. We
will argue that the OLR and the CMLR determine a different set of prob-
lems and strategies. In the second section of this paper we will analyze the
need, implied by the CMLR, of bringing into stage a different metaphysical
scheme to the one assumed by the OLR. We will discuss the famous ‘mea-
surement problem’ of the OLR and argue that, from the perspective of the
CMLR this problem can be inverted and turned into what we call ‘the su-
perposition problem’. In section 3, we discuss what we know about quantum
superpositions and analyze the meaning of contradiction in QM as related
to the formal understanding of quantum possibility and its contextual con-
straints as exposed in the Modal Kochen-Specker theorem. In section 4, we
give specific answers to the six main obstacles mentioned above. Finally,
in the last section, we present some remarks and analyze the proposal of
Krause and Arenhart to understand contradictions in terms of the square of
opposition.
1 Metaphysical Stances, Interpretative Strategies
and Problems
In The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen [40, p. xviii] makes a remarkable
claim: “The problem of appearance and reality affects first of all philosophy
itself. I argue for a view of philosophy as a stance, as existential.” To
consider philosophy as a stance, as existential, means that our analysis is
not void of values, intentions and presuppositions. These must be made
explicit in order to be honest about the limits of our own arguments. Van
Fraassen continues [Op. cit., p. 17]:
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“Philosophy itself is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise; phi-
losophy is in false consciousness when it sees itself otherwise. To me
philosophy is of overriding importance, to our culture, to our civiliza-
tion, to us individually. For it is the enterprise in which we, in every
century, interpret ourselves anew. But unless it so understands itself,
it degenerates into an arid play of mere forms.”
From this perspective —which we support— quite immediately we are driven
into the specific consideration of the metaphysical presuppositions that we
accept or not in a given analysis.
Aristotle defined metaphysics as a theory of “being qua being” [Meta-
physics: 1003a20] a theory about what it means or implies to “be” in its
different senses. Since then, it has become clear that the importance of meta-
physical thought within physical theories can be hardly underestimated. As
noticed by Edwin Arthur Burtt [9, p. 224]: “[...] there is no escape from
metaphysics, that is, from the final implications of any proposition or set
of propositions. The only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say
nothing.” Unfortunately, physics does not escape this state of affairs, as re-
marked by Einstein [12, p. 1196]: “The problem is that physics is a kind of
metaphysics; physics describes ‘reality’. But we do not know what ‘reality’
is. We know it only through physical description...” Indeed, due to the fact
a physical problem is always constituted through a metaphysical perspec-
tive there is no neutral nor distant questioning regarding a physical object.
Posing a problem involves definite metaphysical presuppositions and choices
without which questions remain meaningless. The problem constitutes the
object of inquiry itself. The problem of interpreting QM, for example, which
makes complete sense from a realist perspective is completely meaningless
from an instrumentalist one. Instrumentalism has a set of problems different
from those of realism. Furthermore, a problem determines —implicitly— its
own set of possible answers, placing in itself a limit to knowledge and un-
derstanding and it is through this same limit that we learn about the world.
As we shall see, posing problems to QM is a subtle task which is some times
betrayed by hidden agendas.
1.1 The OLR (and its Problems)
Let us first start by characterizing the OLR. We can do so in terms of
two main metaphysical presuppositions which seem to have sedimented in
present philosophy of QM. Both presuppositions can be found to play a
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major role not only in most interpretations of QM but also in the problems
posed in the literature. The first one is related to a very widespread idea
concerning the progress and unification of physics. This trend of thought
finds a very clear exposure in terms of what many physicists claim to be the
holy grail of science, the search for the last equation, the unified Theory of
Everything (T.O.E.). With respect to QM, unification has imposed the need
to find a bridge between the quantum formalism and the classical physical
representation of the world. This first presupposition was stated by Bohr in
terms of his correspondence principle.
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one can find a
bridge between classical mechanics and QM; i.e., that the main notions
of classical physics can be used in order to explain quantum theory.
Although one might claim that the history of triumphs in physics due to
the idea of unification has been very vast, one might also argue that since
the creation of QM this methodological principle has been witness to too
many lost battles. Today, the confinement of the quantum formalism to an
instrumentalist enterprise —a move that might be traced to Bohr’s own in-
terpretation of the quantum wave function as an algorithmic device— might
be also understood as the acceptance of the failure of the correspondence
principle and the limits of physical interpretation itself.
The second metaphysical principle can be also traced to Bohr’s claim
that physical experience needs to be expressed exclusively in terms of clas-
sical language [7]. If one considers the core of the classical physical and
metaphysical representation of the world one is then stuck with two main
concepts: ‘entity’ and ‘actuality’ (as a mode of existence). In QM one can
also encounter these metaphysical notions as basic elements of any interpre-
tation.
2. Quantum Systems and Actuality: The principle that one needs
to presuppose the metaphysics of entities together with the mode of
being of actuality in any interpretation of QM.
Let us make a short detour that will help us to understand not only the
importance of these concepts but also their historicity. It makes no harm
to recall that both notions, ‘entity’ and ‘actuality’, were created by Aristo-
tle. Another important concept erased from our contemporary conception
of the world, but which also played a major role in Aristotle’s metaphysics,
is the concept of ‘potentiality’ —we will return to this notion through the
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rest of the paper. In Aristotle’s scheme, movement was considered as the
path from potentiality, which contained the undetermined, contradictory
and non-individual realm of existence, to the actual mode of being, deter-
mined through the logical principles of existence and non-contradiction. It
was through these same principles together with the principle of identity that
the concept of entity was put forward —together with classical logic itself
(see for discussion [41]). Through these principles the notion of entity was
capable of unifying, of totalizing in terms of a “sameness”, creating certain
stability for knowledge to be possible. This representation or transcendent
description of the world is considered by many as the origin of metaphysical
thought itself. Actuality is then linked directly to metaphysical representa-
tion and understood as characterizing a mode of existence independent of
observation. Indeed, this is the way through which metaphysical thought
was able to go beyond the hic et nunc, creating a world beyond the world, a
world of concepts. In physics, it was this possibility which allowed us to deal
with experience in a ‘third person’ manner and predict even non-performed
experiments.
The transformation from medieval to modern science coincides with the
abolition of Aristotelian hylomorphic metaphysical scheme —in terms of
potentiality and actuality— as the foundation of knowledge. However, the
basic structure of Aristotelian logic still remained the basis for correct rea-
soning. As noted by Verelst and Coecke [41, p. 7]:
“Dropping Aristotelian metaphysics, while at the same time contin-
uing to use Aristotelian logic as an empty ‘reasoning apparatus’ implies
therefore loosing the possibility to account for change and motion in
whatever description of the world that is based on it. The fact that
Aristotelian logic transformed during the twentieth century into differ-
ent formal, axiomatic logical systems used in today’s philosophy and
science doesn’t really matter, because the fundamental principle, and
therefore the fundamental ontology, remained the same. This ‘emp-
tied’ logic actually contains an Eleatic ontology, that allows only for
static descriptions of the world.”
As a consequence of this choice, potentiality was completely eliminated from
physics. After Newton, only actuality remained as the mode of existence of
physical objects. One cannot underestimate the role played by the XVII
century division between ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’ separating very
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clearly the realms of actuality and potentiality.1 Once this separation was
achieved, the realm of potentiality, as a different (ontological) mode of the
being, was erased becoming not more than mere (logical) possibility. It was
Isaac Newton who was able to translate into a closed mathematical formal-
ism both, the ontological presuppositions present in Aristotelian (Eleatic)
logic and the materialistic ideal of ‘res extensa’ together with actuality as
its mode of existence. In classical mechanics the representation of the state
of the physical system is given by a point in phase space Γ and the physical
magnitudes are represented by real functions over Γ. These functions com-
mute in between each others and can be interpreted as possessing definite
(non-contradictory) values independently of measurement, i.e. each func-
tion can be interpreted as being actual. The term actual refers of course
here to preexistence (within the transcendent representation) and not to the
observation hic et nunc. Every physical system may be described exclu-
sively by means of its actual properties. The evolution of the system may
be described by the evolution of its actual properties. Thus, potential or
possible properties are considered only as the points to which the system
might arrive in a future instant of time. The physics of Newton became a
physics of pure actuality, providing a description of the universe in terms of
an Actual State of Affairs (ASA) [23, p. 124].
Going back to QM, the OLR is based implicitly on this metaphysical
scheme and seeks for answers in terms of this same metaphysical presuppo-
sitions. Due to the closure of the scheme, the problems posed by the OLR
concentrate in justifying the classical description of the world in terms of
entities or properties in the actual mode of existence. We can find many
examples of such problems in the literature: the quantum to classical limit,
which was supposedly resolved through decoherence, the problem of non-
locality which implicitly considers space-time in relation to QM, the problem
of identical particles which presupposes the notion of entity or the problem
of holism and quantum separability which also assumes, as a standpoint,
that we have quantum systems and that we can ‘cut’ such systems into
parts. One of the main problems that interests us here and will be subject
of analysis and discussion is the famous measurement problem.
1The philosophy which was developed after Descartes kept ‘res cogitans’ (thought) and
‘res extensa’ (entities as acquired by the senses) as separated realms. While ‘res cogitans’,
the soul, was related to the indefinite realm of potentiality, ‘res extensa’, i.e. the entities
as characterized by the principles of logic, related to the actual.
7
1.2 The CMLR (and its Problems)
Regarding the methodology to solve problems, following [14], we have claimed
in [13] that one can find two main strategies regarding the problem of in-
terpreting QM. The first strategy is to begin with a presupposed set of
metaphysical principles and advance towards a new formalism. Examples of
this strategy are the collapse theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and We-
ber (also called ‘GRW theory’) [30] which introduces non-linear terms in the
Schro¨dinger equation and Bohmian mechanics which introduces space-time
particles. As remarked by Bitbol [3, p. 8]: “Bohm’s original theory of 1952
is likely to be the most metaphysical (in the strongest, speculative, sense)
of all readings of quantum mechanics. It posits free particle trajectories in
space-time, that are unobservable in virtue of the theory itself.” The second
strategy is to accept the orthodox formalism of QM and advance towards the
creation and elucidation of the metaphysical principles which would allow
us to answer the question: ‘what is QM talking about’? Examples of this
second strategy are quantum logic and its different lines of development such
as the Geneva School of Jauch and Piron [36] or the modal interpretation
of Van Fraassen and Dieks [42]. From this perspective, the importance is to
focus in the formalism of the theory and try to learn about the symmetries,
the logical features and structural relations. The idea is that, by learning
about such aspects of the theory we can also develop the metaphysical con-
ditions which should be taken into account in a coherent interpretation of
QM. However, even within this second strategy which seems less keen to
embrace classical metaphysics, the OLR is very strong. As a matter of fact,
many approaches which take the formalism as a standpoint end up going
back to the classical metaphysical notions that we already characterized.
Our proposal is to consider the second strategy but accept the possibility
to go beyond our classical metaphysical representation (in terms of entities
or an ASA), engaging at the same time in the necessary creation of new
concepts in order to find a suitable (non-classical) metaphysical scheme to
interpret coherently QM and its phenomena.
Although we understand that the OLR was, at the begging, the most
reasonable and obvious path to follow —mainly due to its success in the
three centuries before the creation of QM—, time has proven that this line of
research has not been a very successful one for interpreting QM. As a matter
of fact, after more than one century, we have not seemed to advance very
much in the understanding of the theory nor have we been able to develop a
coherent interpretation. We are still stuck with the same problems. We do
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not understand what is the meaning of quantum probability nor quantum
possibility —we will come back to this point in the following section—, we
do not understand what is the meaning of quantum contextuality, we do not
even know how to interpret a quantum state [20], nor we understand what
a quantum superposition is or represents. In short, still today, it is safe to
say we do not know what QM is talking about.
Regarding the first metaphysical principle of the OLR we must remark
there exist many philosophical positions which do not assume the need of
unification. Following Heisenberg we have argued elsewhere in favor of
a closed theory approach [15, 16]. As remarked by Bokulich [5, p. 79]:
“The German phrase that Heisenberg uses is abgeschlossene Theorie, where
abgeschlossene can be translated as ‘closed’, ‘locked’, ‘isolated’, or ‘self-
contained’.” Heisenberg understands ‘closed theories’ as a relation of tight
interconnected concepts, definitions and laws whereby a large field of phe-
nomena can be described. Every physical theory needs to develop its own
conceptual scheme.2 The only important aspect to consider a physical the-
ory as ‘closed’ is the internal coherency between the formal mathematical
elements, the conceptual structure and the physical experience created by
these same concepts. An important aspect of this approach is that each
physical theory is only able to attack a restricted set of problems and ques-
tions, those which presuppose the concepts and formal structure put forward
by the theory itself.
Now, if we were to criticize the OLR, there are some very week spots we
can find to counterattack. From a methodological perspective it seems not
very smart to take as standpoint, in order to solve problems, presuppositions
which —we already know— have problems with the theory in the first place.
If everything seems to point in the direction that QM has problems with the
notions of ‘identity’, ‘non-contradiction’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘entity’, ‘actuality’,
etc. Why should we keep trying to solve problems with these very same
concepts? Why should we accept that the only way of posing problems
is according to the classical metaphysical scheme? As remarked already
by Dieks [22, p. 1417]: “This would deny the possibility of really new
fundamental theories, conceptually independent of classical physics.”
Taking into account the need to provide a conceptual physical represen-
tation of these experiments and the fact that it is the orthodox formalism
2As remarked by Heisenberg in an interview by Thomas Kuhn [6, p. 98]: “The decisive
step is always a rather discontinuous step. You can never hope to go by small steps nearer
and nearer to the real theory; at one point you are bound to jump, you must really leave
the old concepts and try something new... in any case you can’t keep the old concepts.”
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which is being used, our CMLR is based on three main presuppositions
already put forward in [15, pp. 56-57].
1. Closed Representational Stance: Each physical theory is closed
under its own formal and conceptual structure and provides access to
a specific set of phenomena. The theory also provides the constraints
to consider, explain and understand physical phenomenon. The un-
derstanding of a phenomena is always local for it refers to the closed
structure given by the physical theory from which observations are
determined.
2. Formalism and Empirical Adequacy: The formalism of QM is
able to provide (outstanding) empirically adequate results. Empirical
adequacy determines the success of a theory and not its commitment
to a certain presupposed conception of the world. Thus, it seems to
us that the problem is not to find a new formalism. On the contrary,
as remarked by Dieks in relation to modal interpretations, the ‘road
signs’ point in the direction that we must stay close to the orthodox
quantum formalism.
3. Constructive Stance: To learn about what the formalism of QM is
telling us about reality we might be in need of creating new physical
concepts.
What is needed according to the CMLR is a radical inversion of orthodoxy
and its problems. According to this inversion, for example, the question
of contextuality is not a problem which we need to escape but rather a
central characteristic that any interpretation of QM should respect. The
non-separable character of QM, its specificity with respect to identity and
individuality, the indeterminate and indeterministic aspects, etc., should be
also considered in a coherent interpretation of the theory. Going back to the
meaning of quantum superpositions, instead of considering the measurement
problem we should invert the questioning —changing the perspective— and
concentrate in the analysis of what we have called: ‘the superposition prob-
lem’.
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2 The Superposition Problem: Beyond Entities
and Actuality
The Measurement Problem (MP) is one of the main questions imposed by
the OLR. Given the fact that QM describes mathematically the sate in
terms of a superposition, the question is why do we observe a single result
instead of a superposition of them? Although the MP accepts the fact that
there is something very weird about quantum superpositions, leaving aside
their problematic meaning, it focuses on the justification of the actualization
process. Taking as a standpoint the single outcome it asks: how do we
get there from the quantum superposition? The questioning is completely
analogous to the one posed by the quantum to classical limit problem: how
do we get from weird QM into our safe classical physical description of the
world? The MP is thus an attempt to justify why, regardless of QM, we
only observe actuality. The problem places the result in the origin, what
needs to be justified is the already known answer. But, could it be we were
asking the wrong question?
We need to see the problem from a different perspective, we need to
think differently. Our approach has attempted to invert the MP and re-
place it with what we call the superposition problem [15]. As we mentioned
before, this problem departs from the OLR and imposes a different perspec-
tive regarding what needs to be understood. According to the superposition
problem what needs to be interpreted is the mathematical expression (i.e.,
the quantum superposition:
∑
ci |αi >) which allows us to predict prob-
abilistically measurement outcomes. But in order to do so we need to go
beyond the question regarding measurement outcomes. Before we can under-
stand actualization we first need to explain what a quantum superposition
is or represents; for there is an obvious asymmetry in comparing, on the one
hand, a mathematical expression and, on the other, an actualized outcome.
Furthermore, there is no self evident path between the superposition and its
outcome. As it is well known there are multiple ways of understanding the
projection postulate (see for a discussion [18]).
Let us, for the sake of the argument, grant that the CMLR is the correct
path to follow —which remains of course a logical possibility. How should we
then proceed? The perspective is quite different from the OLR regarding
what needs to be done in order to interpret QM. If we consider it as a
closed theory we should not concentrate in its relation to classical physics
but rather attempt to develop QM itself —and only later on try to find out
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how QM relates to classical physics. In such case we would need to find
new concepts which match the formalism in analogous fashion to the way
the notion of object and space-time allow us to interpret the evolution of
a mathematical point within the formal architectonic of classical mechanics
(see for discussion [20]).
In QM contextuality does not allow us to interpret the orthodox formal-
ism in terms of an ASA independently of a subjective choice [15, 18]. We
need to choose a single basis or context in order to recover a classical struc-
ture in which we can consider the preexistence of define valued properties.3
But even once the choice of the basis is produced we still run into trouble
with the notion of physical entity, which appears to be in the context of QM
what Gaston de Bachelard would call an “epistemological obstruction” [17].
This epistemological obstruction is already present once we talk of vectors
as ‘states’ (see for discussion [20]). As remarked by Michel Bitbol [3, p. 72]:
“The tendency to reify state vectors manifests itself in the use of the very
word ‘state’. The ‘grammar’ (in Wittgenstein’s sense) of the word ‘state’
requires that this is the state of something; that it belongs to something;
that it characterizes this something independently of anything else. Such
grammar, and the conception associated to it, is sufficient to generate one
of the major aspects of the measurement problem.” It is these well known
impossibilities of QM to refer to an ASA on the one hand, and to make
reference to objects on the other, which allow us to conclude that —after
trying our best for more than one century— a possible line of research would
be to drop these notions and concentrate in the creation of new ones.
3 Superpositions, Potentiality and Contradictions
in Quantum Mechanics
Fortunately, experimentalists (in actual laboratories!) do not seem to care
much about philosophical discussions regarding QM. Quite independently of
the MP they have kept using quantum superpositions and the orthodox for-
malism in order to produce the most outstanding technical developments of
3Indeed, as clearly remarked by Janes [31, p. 381]: “[O]ur present [quantum mechan-
ical] formalism is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar mixture describing in part
realities of Nature, in part incomplete human information about Nature —all scrambled
up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how to unscramble. Yet
we think that the unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further advance in basic physical
theory. For, if we cannot separate the subjective and objective aspects of the formalism,
we cannot know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.”
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the last decades. But although we can use superpositions to teleport infor-
mation or implement quantum computers, we still cannot find the physical
concept which unifies all we have learnt about them. Indeed, there are many
characteristics and behaviors we have learnt about superpositions: we know
about their existence regardless of the effectuation of one of its terms, as
shown, for example, by the interference of different possibilities in welcher-
weg type experiments [11, 32], their reference to contradictory properties, as
in Schro¨dinger cat states [34], we also know about their non-standard route
to actuality, as explicitly shown by the MKS theorem [24, 18], and we even
know about their non-classical interference with themselves and with other
superpositions, used today within the latest technical developments in quan-
tum information processing [2]. In spite of the fact we still cannot say what
a quantum superposition is or represents, we must admit that they seem
ontologically robust.
It should be clear that the importance to find out how to represent physi-
cally quantum superpositions is not only philosophical but also technological
for it is only through physical concepts that really new experiments could
be designed. There are many elements which can be seen as “road signs”
that point in the direction of an ontological interpretation of quantum su-
perpositions. If the terms within a quantum superposition are considered
as quantum possibilities (of being actualized) —and it seems difficult not
to agree with such an idea— then we must also admit that such possibili-
ties interact according to the Schro¨dingier equation. It is also well known
that one can produce interactions between multiple superpositions (entan-
glement) and then calculate the behavior of all terms as well as the ratio
of all possible outcomes. It then becomes difficult not to believe that these
terms that ‘interact’, ‘evolve’ and ‘can be predicted’ according to the the-
ory, are not real (in some way). This is the main reason, which we find
very strong, to interpret all terms in the superposition as existing (in some
way). Since we know that each term in the superposition relates to a specific
possibility —which can interact with a different possibility— it makes good
sense to develop an ontological notion of possibility which supports whatever
quantum superpositions are. But, exactly because of what we have learnt
already, we should be careful not to claim —as Arenhart and Krause seem
to imply— that superpositions exist in the realm of actuality.
We believe a reasonable strategy would then be to start with what we
know works perfectly well, namely, the orthodox formalism of QM. Starting
from the formalism, a good candidate to develop a mode of existence is of
course quantum possibility. In several papers, together with Domenech and
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Freytes, we have analyzed how to understand possibility in the context of
the orthodox formalism of QM [24, 25, 26, 27]. From this investigation there
are several conclusions which can be drawn. We started our analysis with a
question regarding the contextual aspect of possibility. As it is well known,
Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem does not talk about probabilities, but rather
about the constraints of the formalism to actual definite valued properties
considered from multiple contexts. What we found via the analysis of pos-
sible families of valuations is that a theorem which we called —for obvious
reasons— the Modal KS (MKS) theorem can be derived which proves that
quantum possibility, contrary to classical possibility, is also contextually
constrained. This means that, regardless of its use in the literature: quan-
tum possibility is not classical possibility.4 In a recent paper, [18] we have
concentrated in the analysis of actualization within the orthodox frame and
interpreted, following the structure, the logical realm of possibility in terms
of potentiality.
Once we accept we have two distinct realms of existence: potentiality
and actuality, we must be careful about the way in which we define con-
tradictions. Certainly, contradictions cannot be defined in terms of truth
valuations in the actual realm, simply because we have distinguished that
the notion that must interpret superpositions is an existent in the potential
realm —not in the actual one. The MKS theorem shows explicitly that a
quantum wave function implies multiple incompatible valuations which can
be interpreted as potential contradictions. Thus, one can claim that while
contradictions exist in the potential realm, they can never be found in ac-
tuality. Our analysis has always kept in mind the idea that contradictions
—by definition— are never found in the actual realm. Our attempt is to
turn things upside-down: we do not need to explain the actual via the po-
tential but rather, we need to use the actual in order to develop the potential
[15, p. 148].
4 Answers to Arenhart and Krause
Now that we have specified our perspective, as well as the stance implicitly
assumed by Arenhart and Krause, we are ready to address more specifically
some of the arguments and obstacles raised by them against the PAQS.
4For a discussion regarding the important distinction between mathematical formalism
and physical interpretation, as well as between the algebraic structure, the language and
the meta-language, see: [18, p. 15].
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I. The PAQS does not allow for contradictions due to its incompat-
ibility with the Semantic Requirement (SR), the Minimal Prop-
erty Ascription Condition (MPAC) and the Paraconsistent Prop-
erty Ascription (PPA).
In order to criticize the notion of contradiction supposedly assumed by
the PAQS, Arenhart and Krause [1] present several conditions which, they
claim, become incompatible within the approach. Firstly they propose the
SR: “Contradictory statements [of the language] must have opposite truth
values.” To analyze a specific situation in QM they take the following quan-
tum state: α | ↑x> + β | ↓x> and claim that: “The statements corre-
sponding to properties represented by | ↑x><↑x | and | ↓x><↓x | must
have opposite truth values.” [Op. cit., p. 2] They then proceed to consider
two property ascriptions, the MPAC: “If a system is in an eigenstate of an
operator with eigenvalue v, then the system has the qualitative property
corresponding to such value of the observable.” And the PPA: “When in
a superposition, the system does have the properties related to the vectors
forming the superposition, and they are contradictory.” [Op. cit., p. 2]
Arenhart and Krause then argue that: “when the conditions for applica-
tion of the minimal principle [MPAC] are met, both states have opposite
truth values. But the job is still not done: we must still grant that one
of those propositions must always be the case (being so that the other one
will be false), as the semantic requirement [SR] for a contradiction seems to
demand.” [Op. cit., p. 5] Their conclusion is then the following:
“it seems that the semantic requirement [SR] that one of the two
terms in a superposition must always be the case (so that we can have
a contradiction) is in fact in conflict with the paraconsistent property
attribution [PPA] principle. For the latter principle to apply, in the
case of a superposition, both ‘up’ and ‘down’ would have to be the
case simultaneously. Recall what happens in the case of the two slit
or Schro¨dinger’s cat: according to this proposal [PAQS], the particle
must go by both slits, the cat must be dead and alive. So, there cannot
be alternate truth values in this case, for both must be simply true.
So, there is a conflict of the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA]
principle with the very requirement that the vectors in a superposi-
tion stand for contradictory properties, at least according to the usual
semantic requirements [SR] related to contradictions, as it appears in
the traditional analysis of this concept. It seems that one cannot have
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both the claim that ux [| ↑x><↑x |] and dx [| ↓x><↓x |] are contra-
dictory and the claim that a superposition involves contradictions, as
supplied by the paraconsistent property attribution [PPA] principle.
As it stands, it seems, these demands are incompatible.” [Op. cit., p.
5]
Let us analyze the presuppositions for the argument to stand. Both
conditions, SR and MPAC, imply an analysis either in terms of actuality or
actualization. But as we mentioned above, the notion of contradiction that
we mean to put forward must consider the level of potentiality independent
of actuality. If the superposition (as a physical notion) exists in potentiality,
such conditions cannot be taken into account for they implicitly assume that
what is found out in actuality must be directly referred to superpositions
irrespectively of their mode of existence. However, if the mode of existence
to which such conditions make reference are considered, there is plenty of
room to take them into account within the PAQS.
The existence of powers or capacities in Nature is a well known subject
in metaphysics and philosophy of physics [33, 10]. An analogy with the
measurement of a power can show us why the argument of Krause and
Arenhart does not follow irrespectively of the metaphysical considerations
of the subject under study. Let us, for the sake of the argument, admit that
powers (which are not entities of course) exist in nature, in a potential mode
of existence. There exist contradictory powers such as ‘putting my hand up’
or ‘putting my hand down’ (following the PPA). If I ‘put my hand up’ (in
actuality) then everyone who is looking will learn that I posses such a power
(as demanded by the MPAC), and at the same time, everyone will have
observed that (in actuality) I did not ‘put my hand down’ (only one of the
two possibilities will be ‘true’ in the actual realm as required by the SR) —
viceversa, when I ‘put my hand down’. The expression of a power in actuality
exposes its existence in exactly the same way we can only see an object when
light shines upon it. Taking into account the Closed Representational Stance:
every physical theory determines its own specific conditions to expose the
existents of which it talks about. Does the measurement of a power involve
a collapse? The answer is no: the expression of the power does not mean
that the power has been destroyed nor that other powers have ceased to
exist. The fact that I ‘put my hand up’ in actuality does not imply in
any way that I will cease to have this power in the future. Do we need
actuality to claim that a power exists? The answer is no: I could choose
not to raise my hand but nonetheless still claim that the power exists —in
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the same way that when I close my eyes I can still claim that the table in
front of me exists. As remarked in our Constructive Stance, actuality is not
necessarily considered as a limit to the representation of reality. This simple
example attempts to show that if one moves away from the metaphysics of
‘entities’ and ‘properties’, there are different ways to think about existence
and actualization. Entities and the actual mode of existence might not be
the end of the road.
What is at stake in QM is the meaning itself of existence —QM does
not seem to make reference to an ASA—, this is why we are not committed
necessarily to a definite metaphysical stance such as the one implied by the
OLR. SR and MPAC are not necessary conditions for every interpretation
of QM that we can think of. They already imply a metaphysical stance in
which reality is conceived only in terms of entities in the actual mode of
existence. But, as we have shown above, if we include the mode of existence
within the conditions themselves, we can certainly consider SR, MPAC and
PPA within the PAQS. By claiming that PPA refers to the potential realm
while MPCA refers to actualization —something we have discussed in detain
in [18]— and SR to the actual realm, all conditions are met by the PAQS
and the problems raised by Arenhart and Krause disappear.
II. The PAQS obscures the meaning of probability in QM.
In several passages (e.g., pages 4 and 5) Arenhart and Krause seem to
argue that PAQS does not allow for a good interpretation of probability in
the context of QM. More specifically they argue that:
“Besides that lack of additional explanatory power or enlighten-
ment on the theory [by the PAQS], there are some additional difficul-
ties here. There is a complete lack of symmetry with the standard
case of property attribution in quantum mechanics. As it is usually
understood, by adopting the minimal property attribution principle, it
is not contentious that when a system is in one eigenstate of an observ-
able, then we may reasonably infer that the system has the property
represented by the associated observable, so that the probability of
obtaining the eigenvalue associated is 1. In the case of superpositions,
if they represented properties of their own, there is a complete disanal-
ogy with that situation: probabilities play a different role, a system
has a contradictory property attributed by a superposition irrespective
of probability attribution and the role of probabilities in determining
measurement outcomes. In a superposition, according to the proposal
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we are analyzing, probabilities play no role, the system simply has a
given contradictory property by the simple fact of being in a (certain)
superposition.”
Some remarks go in order. Firstly, QM does not only talk about proba-
bility. The KS theorem, which we have mentioned before does not talk about
probabilities but about actual definite values of observables. As a mater of
fact, if QM would be only talking about probability, then there would be
no single interpretational problem for the average values of all observables
(commuting or not) are perfectly well defined in the theory. The problem
is that QM does not describe a mere ensemble of individuals. We do not
know what is an individual according to QM, neither is it clear what is the
relation between preexistence and observation. As we know, it makes no
sense to assume that the measurement exposes an already preexistent ASA
[35]. (This is why MPAC needs to be so weak in the first place!) We do not
know what it means that a superposition exists and we do not know how to
relate it to actual observations. But claiming that the PAQS does not allow
for a good interpretation of probability obviously implies that we know what
quantum probability is talking about. This is simply not true. We do not
know what quantum probability means in terms of a physical concept. We
do have a physical interpretation for classical (Kolmogorovian) probability,
but this is not the case in QM. There is a whole literature regarding this
point [38], but we can neither forget that the well known interpretations put
forward by Popper, with his propensity interpretation of probabilities [37],
and Bohm, with his causal interpretation, where specifically designed in or-
der to find an answer to the meaning of quantum probability.5 The phrase
“QM is a probabilistic theory”, commonly used within the literature (and
also addressed by Arenhart and Krause), is from our perspective: either an
obvious mathematical statement with no interest —it only states the well
known fact that in QM there is a (non-Kolmogrovian) probability measure
assigned via Gleason’s theorem— or a meaningless physical statement, since
5As remarked by Bohm [4, p. 465] himself: “[...] in the usual interpretation two
completely different kinds of statistics are needed. First, there is the ordinary statistical
mechanics, which treats of the distortion of systems among the quantum states, resulting
from various chaotic factors such as collisions. The need of this type of statistics could
in principle be avoided by means of more accurate measurements [...]. Secondly, how-
ever, there is the fundamental and irreducible probability distribution, P (x) = |ψ(x)|2
[...]. The need of this type of statistics cannot even in principle be avoided by means of
better measurements, nor can it be explained in terms of the effects of random collision
processes.”
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we do not know what quantum probability is in terms of a physical concept.
This was a fact already known to the founding fathers of the theory. For
example, as noticed by Schro¨dinger [8, p. 115] in a letter to Einstein:
“It seems to me that the concept of [physical] probability is ter-
ribly mishandled these days. [Physical] probability surely has as its
substance a statement as to whether something is or is not the case
—an uncertain statement, to be sure. But nevertheless it has meaning
only if one is indeed convinced that the something in question quite
definitely is or is not the case. A [physical] probabilistic assertion
presupposes the full reality of its subject.”
The problem with probability in QM is that we cannot assert the full reality
of the subject, or in other words, there is no ASA of which quantum prob-
ability could be talking about. Finally, we should remark that Arenhart
and Krause mix statements regarding the probability of obtaining one of
the terms in a superposition, before and after the measurement has taken
place (see e.g. pp. 4 and 10). As we shall argue in IV, one needs to be
very careful regarding such analysis for it is also well known that conditional
probability does not entail a necessary interpretation in terms of a collapse.6
III. The PAQS does not explain the MP.
Analyzing the PAQS, Arenhart and Krause [Op. cit., p. 6] also claim
the following:
“PAQS makes it even more difficult to understand how a typical
measurement of a system in superposition yields always determinate
results, but not contradictory results: one must be able to explain how
a property possessed by the system disappears, while the other one
remains.”
This remark is focused in the explanation of the phenomenon in the actual
realm of existence. As we have argued above, once we consider two levels:
the potential and the actual, the problem of actualization cannot be posed
only in terms of actuality. Furthermore, Arenhart and Krause claim that the
6As a matter of fact, the conditional probability of obtaining B at t2 given that A was
observed in t1, p(B, t2|A, t1), does not relate in any way the probabilities of measuring
A at t1, p(A, t1), and the probability of measuring B at t2, p(B, t2). I am indebted to
Prof. Dieks for pointing out to me this subtle point of non-collpase interpretations. See
for discussion: [21].
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terms which do not get actualized after measurement suddenly “disappear”,
an interpretational move which is not self evident and presupposes collapse.
We will come back to this interpretational maneuver in VI.
IV. Contrary to what is claimed by PAQS, contradictions are not
observed in QM.
The meaning of observation is of course a subtle point in QM, one at
the hart of all interpretational problems. An important consequence of
accepting the CMLR is that every new theory determines at the same time
a new experience [16]. Following this line of though we have criticized the
idea of observation in QM assumed as classical experience. In this respect,
Arenhart and Krause have claimed —focusing once again in the MP— that:
“For another disanalogy [of PAQS] with the usual case, one does not expect
to observe a system in such a contradictory state: every measurement gives
us a system in a particular state, never in a superposition.” [Op. cit., p. 10]
According to our stance, in order to have a closed experience such as
that provided, for example, by classical physics there is a need of coherency
between the mathematical structure, the concepts of the theory and the
experience exposed through them. Thus when we say that according to
Newtonian mechanics a cup falls to the floor accelerated at 9.8m
s2
in t1 sec-
onds, there is a coherency of the statement, of the concepts implicitly used
(object, space, time, etc.), the formal prediction (according to the equation
of motion) and experience. In QM, because we do not have a coherent lan-
guage that makes contact with the formal structure, experience is not really
well defined. Instead, what we have is a weird discourse which constantly
contradicts itself. When we talk about “quantum particles”, we know that
they are not particles. Some people argue that “this is just a way of talking”.
As we have attempted to show in this paper, language and, more specifically,
physical concepts determine a definite perspective regarding problems and
their solutions articulating our possibilities to think about experience.
Another important aspect regards the fact that one cannot simply “ob-
serve contradictions” (see for discussion: [Op. cit., pp. 104-105]). ‘Con-
tradictions’, like ‘identities’ or ‘causality’, are not something that we find
outside in the world; they are instead the basic metaphysical presuppositions
that shape our theories in order to comprise and make sense of experience.
The fact that contradictions are observed, or not, needs to be addressed
from the standpoint of a coherent interpretation of QM, something we still
do not have. As a matter of fact, we still do not know what is, according to
QM, a ‘click in a detector’ [Op. cit., pp. 108-109].
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V. The PAQS inflates unnecessarily the population of the world
with contradictions.
According to Arenhart and Krause:
“when one takes into account other virtues of a metaphysical the-
ory, such as economy and simplicity, the paraconsistent approach seems
to inflate too much the population of our world. In the presence of more
economical candidates doing the same job and absence of other grounds
on which to choose the competing proposals, the more economical ap-
proaches take advantage. Furthermore, considering economy and the
existence of theories not postulating contradictions in quantum me-
chanics, it seems reasonable to employ Priests razor —the principle
according to which one should not assume contradictions beyond ne-
cessity (see Priest [12])— and stick with the consistent approaches.
Once again, a useful methodological principle seems to deem the inter-
pretation of superposition as contradiction as unnecessary.
On the one hand, Arenhart and Krause claim that there are more eco-
nomical interpretations which do exactly the same job the PAQS does. But
what is the job done by the PAQS? The PAQS brings forward the possi-
bility to interpret all terms in the superposition as existent —supporting
the fact that all terms can be ‘described’, ‘put to interact’ and ‘predicted’
through the Born rule and the Schro¨dingier equation. The price the PAQS
might need to pay is giving up the equation: actuality = reality. Thus, the
PAQS allow us to investigate the possibility of considering a contradictory
(potential) realm independent of actuality. Are there many interpretations
that do this job? It is not clear that such is the case.
As a matter of fact, there is a numerous group of interpretations that do
not even consider quantum superpositions as existent. For example, the so
called Copenhagen interpretation remains agnostic with respect to the mode
of existence of properties prior to measurement. The same interpretation
is endorsed by Van Fraassen in his Copenhagen modal interpretation.7 In
Dieks’ realistic modal version, only one of terms is real (actual), while all
7According to Van Fraassen [39, p. 280]: “The interpretational question facing us is
exactly: in general, which value attributions are true? The response to this question can be
very conservative or very liberal. Both court later puzzles. I take it that the Copenhagen
interpretation —really, a roughly correlated set of attitudes expressed by members of the
Copenhagen school, and not a precise interpretation— introduced great conservatism in
this respect. Copenhagen scientists appeared to doubt or deny that observables even have
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other terms are considered as possible (in the classical sense). Bohmian ver-
sions neglect right from the start the existence of quantum superpositions
and claim instead the existence of a quantum field that governs the evolu-
tion of particles. One might argue that some interpretations, although not
explicitly, leave space to consider superpositions as existent in a potential,
propensity, dispositional or latent realm. The Jauch and Piron School, Pop-
per or Margenau’s interpretations, are a clear example of such proposal (see
for discussion [15] and references therein). However, within such interpreta-
tions the collapse is accepted and potentialities, propensities or dispositions
are only defined in terms of ‘their becoming actual’ —mainly because, forced
by the OLR, they have been only focused in providing an answer to the MP.
In any case, such realms are not further articulated. Only the many worlds
interpretation goes as far as claiming that all terms in the superposition are
real in actuality. However, the quite expensive metaphysical price to pay is
to argue that there is a multiplicity of unobservable Worlds (branches) in
which each one of the terms is actual.
The PAQS does the job of allowing a further formal development of a
realm in which superpositions exist, regardless of actuality.8 In the sense
just discussed the PAQS opens possibilities of development which have
not yet been fully investigated. It should be also clear that we are not
claiming that all terms in the superposition are actual —as in the many
worlds interpretations— overpopulating existence with unobservable actu-
alities. What we claim is that PAQS opens the door to consider all terms
as existent in potentiality —independently of actuality. We claim that just
like we need all properties to characterize a physical object, all terms in
the superposition are needed for a proper characterization of what exists
according to QM. We do not believe that this is overpopulating metaphys-
ically the world with contradictions, but rather an attempt to take into
account what the formalism of QM is telling us. Finally, it is important
to remark that —as we discussed in IV— such contradictory potentialities
are observable just in the same way as actual properties can be observed
in an object. Potentialities can be observed through actual effectuations in
analogous fashion to physical objects —we never observe all perspectives of
values, unless their state forces to say so. I shall accordingly refer to the following very
cautious answer as the Copenhagen variant of the modal interpretation. It is the variant
I prefer.”
8Although we believe there is plenty of room to use the PAQS in many interpretations of
QM, the author of this paper has argued elsewhere in favor of a non-collapse interpretation
which considers the potential realm completely independent of actuality.
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an object simultaneously, instead, we observe at most a single set of actual
properties.
VI. The PAQS does not explain the vanishing of terms in the
superposition after measurement.
Finally, according to Arenhart and Krause:
“a new problem is created by this interpretation [PAQS], because
besides explaining what is it that makes a measurement give a spe-
cific result when the system measured is in a superposition (a problem
usually addressed by the collapse postulate, which seems to be out of
fashion now), one must also explain why and how the contradictory
properties that do not get actualized vanish. That is, besides explain-
ing how one particular property gets actual, one must explain how the
properties posed by the system that did not get actual vanish.
Arenhart and Krause seem to assume that once the populated world of
contradictions is measured all terms except one suddenly disappear. This
implies obviously the interpretation of the Projection Postulate (PP) in
terms of a collapse (i.e., a physical interaction) of the quantum wave func-
tion. But, it is well known that such collapse interpretation is not neces-
sarily the only possible interpretation of the PP. We are inclined to assume
a non-collapse interpretation of PP still considering the specificity of the
actualization process in QM (see for discussion: [18]). Thus PAQS might
allow us to claim that the superpositions remain existent (in potentiality)
independently of their measurement (in actuality).
5 Final Remarks
Arenhart and Krause have also called the attention to the understanding
of contradiction via the Square of Opposition. Elswhere, together with
Domenech and Freytes, we have analyzed via the Square of Opposition the
meaning of quantum possibility. We argued that the notion of possibility
would need to be discussed in terms of the formal structure of the theory
itself and that, in such case, one should not study the Classical Square of
Opposition but rather an Orthomodular Square of Opposition. In [28] we
developed such a structure. In [19] we provided an interpretation of the
Orthomodular Square of Opposition in terms of the notion of potentiality.
In a future paper [29] we plan to analyze the proposal of Arenhart and
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Krause and discuss the meaning of contradiction relating our Orthomodu-
lar Square of Opposition with the constraints implied in the MKS theorem.
We expect that this analysis will provide us with a better understanding of
contradictions in QM.
PAQS allow us to consider a contradictory realm in which superpositions
exist. As we attempted to show the criticisms of Arenhart and Krause,
either arise from assuming the OLR —to which we are not committed— or
by presupposing certain aspects —e.g., a collapse interpretation of the PP,
an actualist understanding of reality, etc.— that we have never assumed in
the first place. Although the author of this paper has a definite perspective
with respect to the interpretation of QM, we prefer to leave open the PAQS
to be used by every interpretation of QM.
We believe that science is about confronting the unknown, it implies a
humble attitude with respect to experience and a critical understanding of
the presuppositions we are willing to make. Science implies the creation
and production of new ways of understanding reality; it is not about trying
to justify that which we already know. We need to become again a child
and observe with admiration and surprise the world that surround us, we
need to imagine beyond the limits of the impossible, we need to think the
unthinkable. While we want to be very cautions about what we know and
be (sometimes) very wild about what we do not know, the OLR seems to
desire exactly the opposite. But exactly because science has always taken
advantage from opposite views and perspectives, we believe that our ap-
proach and line of research, although still speculative and in early stages of
development, deserves the chance of being further developed.
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